I. Introduction
Maritime transport constitutes a significant portion of global trade. About three-quarters of international trade volume moves by sea, making port infrastructure a key consideration in the global supply chain. Ports are not merely physical spaces where ships load and unload cargo; they are strategic infrastructure at the heart of logistics networks. Port terminals, hinterland rail connections, Ro-Ro ramps, container storage areas, and intermodal transfer hubs form a complex logistics ecosystem that directs modern trade flows and requires careful oversight.
For many years, competition law debates in the maritime sector focused on traditional horizontal violations such as liner conferences, price coordination, and capacity sharing. However, recent economic and political shifts have significantly changed the nature of competition. Market power no longer derives solely from pricing capacity; control over logistics infrastructure and access mechanisms have also turned into critical determinants of competitive dynamics. Operating port terminals, managing slot allocation systems, and controlling intermodal transport networks and hinterland logistics corridors can provide companies operating at different stages of the transport chain with strategic advantages that reduce free-market “uncertainty” and influence their competitors’ positions in the market.
This shift introduces a new area of competition law analysis: market foreclosure strategies via infrastructure control. Companies controlling port terminals or key logistics infrastructure may engage in practices that limit competitors’ market access, making this a central focus of competition law. Restricting port access, allocating terminal capacity discriminately, controlling logistics networks through vertical integration, or establishing exclusive relationships between shipping lines and specific ports can directly affect competition.
European Union (“EU”) practice provides an important reference point for a competition law analysis focused on maritime transport and port services. The European Commission’s investigations into shipping alliances, vehicle transport lines, and the organization of logistics networks increasingly examine how infrastructure access impacts competition. In this context, competition concerns arising from Ro-Ro lines, ferry transport and intermodal logistics corridors have necessitated a reevaluation of traditional competition law tools.
This article addresses market foreclosure strategies based on port infrastructure and logistics networks in light of EU practice. It aims to identify how factors such as port access, slot allocation, intermodal network control, and infrastructure dependence are assessed under competition law.
II. Structural Characteristics of the Maritime Transport Market
From a competition law perspective, the maritime transport sector has distinctive structural characteristics. The sector is characterized by high fixed costs, substantial capital investments, and limited infrastructure capacity. Building and operating port terminals requires significant and extensive financial investment, and geographic and environmental constraints often make it difficult to develop new infrastructure. Indeed, due to geographic and environmental factors, new port infrastructure requires the completion of socio-economic and political processes as well as complex bureaucratic procedures. As a result, many ports may display characteristics of a “natural monopoly”.
The natural monopoly of ports closely relates to the “essential facility” doctrine in competition law. More specifically, if access to certain infrastructure is indispensable for competitors, and no reasonable alternatives exist, the infrastructure owner’s refusal to grant access may constitute a competition law infringement. In the maritime transport sector, port terminals, Ro-Ro ramps, and hinterland connections have in some cases been assessed under this doctrine.
The European Commission increasingly examines the impact of port infrastructure on competition from a broader perspective. For instance, where the same economic group operates port terminals and carries out transport activities, the Commission considers that vertical integration may hinder competitors’ access to the market. In such situations, a port operator’s decisions regarding infrastructure allocation become critical under competition law.
III. European Commission Decisions on Competition in Maritime Transport
European Commission decisions concerning the maritime transport sector illustrate the sector’s competitive dynamics. The Commission’s “Maritime Car Carriers[1]” investigation revealed that international car carriers had engaged in price coordination and market sharing for many years. As a result of the investigation, the Commission imposed substantial administrative fines on several major carriers and found that coordination mechanisms in the sector had significantly restricted competition.
Another important Commission review in the maritime transport sector concerned information-sharing systems in the container shipping market. The Commission assessed whether the systematic exchange of price announcements and capacity information among carriers could coordinate market behavior and examined the effects of these practices on competition. These kinds of investigations demonstrate how the organization of transport networks can influence competition.
In the precedent-setting “Case AT.39850 Container Shipping” [2] decision, the Commission found that: large container shipping companies (i) regularly issued public announcements regarding future market developments, (ii) General Rate Increase (GRI) announcements, and (iii) signals regarding capacity and pricing policies. The Commission concluded that these practices:
- increased market transparency and eliminated the uncertainty that forms the basis of competition;
- made it easier for competitors to anticipate each other’s market conduct; and
- could create an indirect mechanism for price coordination.
Competition concerns in the maritime transport sector are not limited to horizontal coordination. Control of port terminals and access to logistics infrastructure have also turned into significant elements of competition analysis. Indeed, structuring port access in favor of certain carriers may hinder competing operators’ entry into the market.
IV. Port Access and Competition
Port access is a critical competitive factor in the maritime transport market due to the essential facility doctrine. When a port’s physical capacity is limited, access decisions made by the port operator can directly affect competition. Denying or delaying access to port terminals can hinder new carriers from entering the market.
The European Commission has examined the competitive effects of port access in various investigations. The Commission evaluates whether port operators’ infrastructure allocation decisions are discriminatory or favor certain undertakings. In such cases, port access is assessed in light of core principles of competition law.
Competition concerns related to port access are especially pronounced in Ro-Ro shipping. Since Ro-Ro transport allows cargo to move directly from ship to road vehicles, it is highly dependent on the technical features of port infrastructure. When the number and capacity of Ro-Ro ramps are limited, control over this infrastructure becomes a critical factor for market entry.
In its decisions, the European Commission has reviewed port access issues by considering actions that block access, pricing of port services, infrastructure usage conditions, the presence of market entry barriers, access barriers between routes, and whether access mechanisms are transparent and non-discriminatory[3]. These decisions are precedential and guiding, establishing principles rather than imposing definitive violations or sanctions.
V. Slot Allocation and Capacity Management
Slot allocation at port terminals is another key competition law issue. When port capacity is limited, planning and assigning berthing times for ships can significantly affect competition. Ensuring that slot allocation mechanisms operate transparently and without discrimination is critical to maintaining competition.
If slot allocation is systematically structured in favor of certain carriers, it may prevent competing operators from using the port effectively. In such cases, the port operator’s conduct may be considered an abuse of a dominant position.
VI. Intermodal Logistics Corridors and Market Foreclosure Strategies
Modern transport systems do not rely solely on maritime transport. Ports sit at the center of logistics networks integrated with rail, road, and inland waterways. Therefore, a competition law analysis must consider not only the maritime transport market but also the broader intermodal logistics market.
Integrating port terminals with rail lines or road logistics hubs can result in control over different stages of the transport chain by the same economic actor. Such vertical integration makes a competition analysis more complex. If a company controls both a port terminal and hinterland transport networks, competitors may face significant barriers to market access.
Market foreclosure strategies in the transport sector often arise not through price competition but through control over infrastructure and logistics networks. Controlling port terminals and logistics corridors can be a powerful tool for limiting competitors’ market entry.
These strategies can take various forms. Limiting port access, allocating terminal capacity in favor of specific carriers, controlling logistics networks through exclusive contracts, or establishing long-term binding agreements between shipping lines and particular ports can all produce market foreclosure effects.
Market foreclosure strategies developed through vertical integration are particularly significant from a competition law perspective. If a shipping company also operates the port terminal, it may have incentives to restrict competitors’ use of the port. In such situations, competition authorities carefully examine how infrastructure control affects competitors’ market access.
These strategies can also arise through control over logistics corridors. When a single economic actor controls the transport network connecting the port to the hinterland, it may prevent the development of alternative logistics solutions. This is especially important in regions with dense intermodal transport networks, where such control can significantly impact competition.
VII. Conclusion
Maritime transport and port infrastructure are among the most critical components of global trade. Control over port terminals, Ro-Ro ramps, and logistics corridors can provide companies with significant competitive advantages. EU practice demonstrates that factors such as port access and control over logistics networks are playing an increasingly central role in competition law analysis.
In the transport sector, competition law no longer focuses solely on traditional violations like price coordination or market sharing. Structural factors such as infrastructure access, slot allocation, and the organization of logistics networks have become decisive in shaping competition.
Accordingly, market foreclosure strategies developed through control of ports and logistics corridors are likely to become a critical area of competition law scrutiny in the coming years.
Gülşah Güven, LL.M., Partner
[1] https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40009/40009_2427_7.pdf
[2] https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39850/39850_3377_3.pdf
[3] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62019CJ0174;
